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2002
LEARNING FROM 9/11—UNDERSTANDING
THE COLLAPSE OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 6, 2002
Serial No. 107–46
VOLUME I
The following material has been made available on an expedited basis
as Volume I of a two-volume set. All additional material for the record
will be made available shortly as part of a second, and all inclusive,
volume.
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
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WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
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JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
C O N T E N T S
March 6, 2002
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L.
Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Anthony D. Weiner,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall,
Minority Ranking Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Steve Israel, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
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Written Statement
Statement by Representative Felix J. Grucci,
Jr., Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Prepared Statement by Representative Constance
Morella, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Nick
Smith, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative J. Randy
Forbes, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F.
Costello, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative John B.
Larson, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Bob
Etheridge, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Panel
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Mr. Robert F. Shea, Acting Administrator,
Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, Federal Emergency
Management Agency
Written Statement
Biography
Dr. W. Gene Corley, Senior Vice President, CTL Engineering
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Professor Glenn P. Corbett, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Dr. Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl, Professor,
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of
California, Berkeley
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce
Written Statement
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Biography
Discussion
Appendix 1: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Mr. Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,
Director, Office of Management and Budget from Mr. Boehlert, Mr.
Weiner, Mr. Israel, and other Members of the Committee on Science
Statement of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign
Statement of the International Code Council
Letters expressing support for, and cooperation
in, a NIST investigation from FEMA and local authorities
LEARNING FROM 9/11—UNDERSTANDING THE COLLAPSE OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:23
p.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood
L. Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
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HEARING CHARTER
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Learning from 9/11—Understanding
the Collapse of the World Trade Center
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2002
12:00 P.M.–2:00 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
I. Purpose
On Wednesday, March 6, at noon the House
Committee on Science will hold a hearing on the investigation into the
collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC). Witnesses from industry,
academia, and government will testify on the catastrophic collapse of
the WTC complex and subsequent efforts by federal agencies and
independent researchers to understand how the building structures
failed and why. By scrutinizing the steel and other debris, blueprints
and other documents, and recorded images of the disaster, engineers,
designers, and construction professionals may learn valuable lessons
that could save thousands of lives in the event of future catastrophes,
natural or otherwise.
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The Committee plans to explore several
overarching questions raised by the collapse and the ensuing
investigation:
1. What have we learned about how the Federal Government
investigates catastrophic building collapses, and are any changes
warranted?
2. What have we learned about the collapse of the World Trade
Center, including which structural elements failed first, and why?
3. How will we know what changes, if any, are warranted in
building and fire codes as a result of lessons learned from the World
Trade Center's collapse?
4. Has the World Trade Center disaster exposed any gaps in our
understanding of buildings and fire, and are changes needed in the
Federal Government's research agenda?
2. Background
At 8:47 a.m. on the morning of September 11,
2001, terrorists crashed a fuel-laden Boeing 767 into the north tower
(Tower 1) of the World Trade Center (WTC) complex. Approximately 16
minutes later, a second Boeing 767 slammed into the south tower (Tower
2), exploding upon impact and engulfing several of the building's upper
floors in flames. While the performance of both towers exceeded their
design specifications—the buildings were designed to withstand the
force from the initial impact of a 707 jet—the subsequent structural
and fire damage still caused the buildings to fall. Tower 2 collapsed
in less than an hour, killing victims trapped above the flames and
rescue workers in and around the building. Thirty minutes later, Tower
1 met the same fate. While more than 25,000 people were successfully
evacuated from the towers, nearly 3,000 people and emergency responders
were killed in the collapses. As the day progressed, the remaining WTC
buildings collapsed as well, including Building 7, which burned for 8
hours before crumbling to the ground. Fortunately, the later building
collapses produced no casualties.
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In the wake of the collapses, search and rescue
workers launched an around-the-clock recovery effort to find and
recover survivors and victims who perished. To make way, literally tons
of twisted steel and fractured concrete were removed from the rubble
pile and loaded onto convoys of bulldozers and flatbed trucks to be
carried away to recycling plants and landfills.
Researchers also began to respond immediately.
Among the first were National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded social
scientists and engineers who arrived at the WTC site within 48 to 72
hours after the tragedy to begin collecting data. Similarly, the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) formed a Disaster Response
Team within hours of the first plane strike. On September 12th, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its contractor,
Greenhorne and O'Mara, Inc., located in Greenbelt, Maryland, commenced
the development of a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT;
explained more fully on the next page) to conduct a formal analysis of
the progressive collapses and produce a report of its findings. A
variety of other engineering researchers and professionals, including
members of the Structural Engineering Association of New York, also
engaged in the monumental task of collecting data that could lead to a
better understanding of the collapse of the buildings themselves and to
the development of mitigation strategies to prevent a similar tragedy
in the future.
Concerns Related to the Engineering Investigation
Though many of the individuals who have
participated in the WTC building performance investigation are
architects and engineers with experience investigating other structural
collapses—including those resulting from natural causes as well as
terrorist attacks—nothing had prepared these investigators for a
disaster of this magnitude and complexity. Unlike the destruction
caused by an earthquake, which may affect several buildings across an
expansive area, this disaster involved many buildings and a massive
debris pile in a small, confined area. Also unlike most earthquakes,
the WTC disaster caused significant casualties and prompted a prolonged
search and rescue effort. In addition, the concurrent criminal
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a separate
investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board further
frustrated the building performance investigators.
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The investigation has been hampered by a number of issues, including:
No clear authority and the absence of an effective
protocol for how the building performance investigators should conduct
and coordinate their investigation with the concurrent search and
rescue efforts, as well as any criminal investigation: Early
confusion over who was in charge of the site and the lack of authority
of investigators to impound pieces of steel for examination before they
were recycled led to the loss of important pieces of evidence that were
destroyed early during the search and rescue effort. In addition, a
delay in the deployment of FEMA's BPAT team may have compounded the
lack of access to valuable data and artifacts.
Difficulty obtaining documents essential to the investigation, including blueprints, design drawings, and maintenance records: The
building owners, designers and insurers, prevented independent
researchers from gaining access—and delayed the BPAT team in gaining
access—to pertinent building documents largely because of liability
concerns. The documents are necessary to validate physical and
photographic evidence and to develop computer models that can explain
why the buildings failed and how similar failures might be avoided in
the future.
Uncertainty as a result of the confidential nature of the BPAT study: The
confidential nature of the BPAT study may prevent the timely discovery
of potential gaps in the investigation, which may never be filled if
important, but ephemeral evidence, such as memories or home videotapes,
are lost. The confidentiality agreement that FEMA requires its BPAT
members to sign has frustrated the efforts of independent researchers
to understand the collapse, who are unsure if their work is
complementary to, or duplicative of, that of the BPAT team. In
addition, the agreement has prevented the sharing of research results
and the ordinary scientific give-and-take that otherwise allows
scientists and engineers to winnow ideas and strengthen results.
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Uncertainty as to the strategy for completing the investigation and applying the lessons learned: The
BPAT team does not plan, nor does it have sufficient funding, to fully
analyze the structural data it collected to determine the reasons for
the collapse of the WTC buildings. (Its report is expected to rely
largely on audio and video tapes of the event.) Nor does it plan to
examine other important issues, such as building evacuation mechanisms.
Instead, FEMA has asked the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to take over the investigation. Yet so far, NIST has
not released a detailed plan describing how it will take over the
investigation, what types of analyses it will conduct, how it will
attempt to apply the lessons it learns to try to improve building and
fire codes, and how much funding it will require.
Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Federal Emergency Management Agency is
charged with supporting the Nation's emergency management system. FEMA
intervenes at all stages of disaster management including preparation,
response, recovery, mitigation, risk reduction, and prevention. In the
case of the World Trade Center attack, FEMA dispatched Urban Search and
Rescue Teams and established a disaster field office at the site within
hours of the first strike to assist in New York City's rescue effort.
At the same time, the FEMA Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT)
began their important work of initiating an analysis that could
ultimately yield valuable information about the sequence of events and
failures that resulted in progressive building collapse.
BPATs are routinely deployed by FEMA following
disasters caused by events such as floods and hurricanes. The teams are
formed by, and operate under the direction of the Mitigation
Directorate's Program Assessment and Outreach Division and comprise
such individuals as regional FEMA staff, representatives from state and
local governments, consultants who are experts in engineering, design,
construction, and building codes, and other technical and support
personnel. A contractor for FEMA, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.,
maintains a roster of hundreds of mitigation specialists from across
the United States. BPAT teams are typically deployed within seven days
of any disaster event.
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Generally, a BPAT conducts field inspections
and technical evaluations of buildings to identify design practices,
construction methods, and building materials that either failed or were
successful in resisting the forces imposed by the event. A major
objective of the BPAT's findings and recommendations are aimed at
improving design, construction and enforcement of building codes to
enhance performance in future disasters. The culmination of the BPAT's
efforts is a report that presents the team's observations, conclusions,
and recommendations for improving building performance in future
natural disasters.
The BPAT team deployed to the WTC site was
assembled by the American Society of Civil Engineers and is headed by
W. Gene Corley, Ph.D., P.E, Senior Vice President of Construction
Technologies Laboratory in Skokie, Illinois. He was also the principal
investigator in the FEMA study of Oklahoma City's Murrah Federal Office
Building. On September 11th, ASCE, in partnership with a number of
other professional organizations, commenced the formation of an
independent team of experts to conduct a building performance
assessment study at the WTC site as part of ASCE's Disaster Response
Procedure. In late September, this team, the ASCE Disaster Response
team, was officially appointed as the BPAT team and was funded by FEMA
to assess the performance of the buildings and report its findings. The
BPAT team received $600,000 in FEMA funding in addition to
approximately $500,000 in ASCE in-kind contributions.
The 23-member BPAT team conducted an analysis
of the wreckage on-site, at Fresh Kills Landfill and at the recycling
yard from October 7–12, 2001, during which the team extracted samples
from the scrap materials and subjected them to laboratory analysis. Why
the analysis was conducted only after a delay of three weeks after the
attacks remains unclear. Since November, members of the Structural
Engineers Association of New York (SEAoNY) have volunteered to work on
the BPAT team's behalf and are visiting recycling yards and landfills
two to three times a week to watch for pieces of scrap that may provide
important clues with regard to the behavior of the buildings.
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In the month that lapsed between the terrorist
attacks and the deployment of the BPAT team, a significant amount of
steel debris—including most of the steel from the upper floors—was
removed from the rubble pile, cut into smaller sections, and either
melted at the recycling plant or shipped out of the U.S. Some of the
critical pieces of steel—including the suspension trusses from the top
of the towers and the internal support columns—were gone before the
first BPAT team member ever reached the site. Fortunately, an
NSF-funded independent researcher, recognizing that valuable evidence
was being destroyed, attempted to intervene with the City of New York
to save the valuable artifacts, but the city was unwilling to suspend
the recycling contract. Ultimately, the researcher appealed directly to
the recycling plant, which agreed to provide the researcher, and
ultimately the ASCE team and the SEAoNY volunteers, access to the
remaining steel and a storage area where they could temporarily store
important artifacts for additional analysis. Despite this agreement,
however, many pieces of steel still managed to escape inspection.
The BPAT team is expected to release its report
in April. Because FEMA requires the members of its BPAT team to sign a
confidentiality agreement until the report is released, the exact scope
of the report is unknown. But it appears from the role that BPAT teams
normally play and general comments ASCE members of the BPAT team have
made that the report is likely to include an examination of how the
buildings behaved leading up to the collapse, hypotheses for which
structural elements failed and thereby initiated the collapse, and
recommendations for additional research and analysis.
For example, ASCE has said that the study will
rely primarily on audio and video recordings, interviews with
survivors, blueprints and design drawings of the World Trade Center,
and evidence they or the SEAoNY volunteers have collected from the
rubble. The BPAT team has access to more than 120 hours of high quality
film footage and audiotapes of 911 communications with trapped victims.
The BPAT team initially had difficulty in obtaining building blueprints
and design drawings from either the City of New York, the Port
Authority, the building owners, or the building designers due primarily
to liability concerns on the part of the building owners and insurers.
Belatedly, however, the team was provided access to these documents in
early January.
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ASCE has said that the BPAT study will not
include an analysis of the evacuation or rescue procedures and may not
be able to validate definitively any of a number of hypotheses
regarding the collapse. But because of the confidentiality of the
report, it is unclear whether the it will provide answers or simply lay
out more questions. It is unknown, for example, to what degree the BPAT
report will compare video evidence with that collected from the steel
beams from the floors that were hit by the planes.
As a result, independent researchers are unsure
how they can contribute to the understanding of how the buildings fell
without unnecessarily duplicating work. Others fear that the BPAT's
silence on the scope of its report may allow critical aspects of the
picture to be missed, and that, by the time the report is released and
any such gaps are discovered, the trail of evidence that could provide
answers may have grown cold.
The National Science Foundation
Researchers supported by the National Science
Foundation are used to mobilizing rapidly after an earthquake and
arriving on scene soon after the event to begin collecting data.
Recognizing the similarities between the WTC disaster and earthquakes,
NSF program managers awarded nearly $300,000 to experienced earthquake
researchers, including engineers and social scientists, to begin an
analysis of the 9/11 terrorist attacks within 72 hours of the events.
In an effort to quickly deploy researchers to the site, awards were
made through the Small Grants for Exploratory Research Program, a
supplemental award program that enables NSF program managers to award
additional support to currently-funded investigators through an
abbreviated internal review process (see Appendix B for a list of awards).
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The efforts of NSF-funded researchers were
impeded by the same obstacles the BPAT team encountered: an inability
to examine the steel, either removed from the site during the early
search and rescue work or shipped to recycling plants, and the denial
of access to building design, construction and maintenance documents.
Interestingly, it was an NSF-funded researcher who ultimately
negotiated the arrangements by which he and others investigating the
disaster were provided access to the remaining pieces of steel at the
recycling plant.
To date, the NSF-funded researchers continue to
face problems. They continue to be denied access to important building
diagrams and blueprints, and so are unable to complete their analyses
or develop the computer models necessary to better understand the
failure of the buildings structural elements. Perhaps more importantly,
without these computer models, engineering researchers will be unable
to develop effective mitigation strategies.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
NISTs Building and Fire Research Laboratory
carries out research in fire science, fire safety engineering, and
structural, mechanical, and environmental engineering. It is the only
federal laboratory dedicated to research on building design and fire
safety. In the past, the lab has investigated several structural
failures using authority Congress made explicit in 1985 (15 U.S.C.
282a). The goals of its previous investigations were to determine the
probable technical causes of the failures, examine what lessons could
be learned from those determinations, and help develop improved
building codes, standards, and practices. The investigations also
identified areas of research that needed further study.
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Shortly
after the attack, NIST appointed an employee of the Building and Fire
Research Laboratory to serve on the 23-member BPAT team. While this
partnership lent some of NIST's resources and expertise to the BPAT
study, NIST did not immediately launch a formal investigation into the
technical causes that led to the collapse of the World Trade Center
buildings.
NIST believes that the World Trade Center
collapse raises difficult and technical questions regarding building
codes and standards, justifying the redirection of funds to its
building and fire lab. For example, standards for concrete design,
building loads, and structural integrity may need revision. In
response, NIST has redirected $2 million of its fiscal year 2002
internal discretionary funds to the lab to supplement its current
building engineering and standards work. NIST has also requested
permission to reprogram from the rest of its laboratories another $2
million in fiscal year 2002 funds for these efforts. The reprogramming
request is currently pending before the Office of Management and Budget
and will ultimately need approval from Congress. NIST did not need
Congressional review to redirect its discretionary funds.
In January, after a delay of three months since
the terrorists' attacks, FEMA asked NIST to take over the next phase of
the investigation of the collapse. Yet neither NIST nor FEMA has
released details as to what that next phase would entail (other than
the general outline NIST has provided below). In addition, the
Administration has not yet indicated whether FEMA, NIST, or a
supplemental funding request to Congress would provide funds for such
an investigation, nor has it identified how much it would cost.
Administration officials and outside parties
are weighing whether a formal arrangement should be made for NIST to
serve as FEMA's research arm in the event of future catastrophic
building failures. Currently, there is no formal relationship between
the two agencies regarding these matters.
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Based on some initial planning, NIST has
preliminarily identified the following general areas for investigation:
Determine technically, why and how the buildings collapsed (WTC 1 and 2, and possibly WTC 7);
Investigate the technical aspects of fire protection, response, and evacuation, and occupant behavior and response;
Determine whether state-of-the-art procedures were used in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the WTC building;
Determine whether there are new technologies and procedures
emerging that could be employed in the future to reduce the potential
risks of collapse; and
Identify building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision.
3. Questions
Please see Appendix A for copies of letters to witnesses and the questions each was asked to address in testimony at the hearing.
4. Witnesses
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The following witnesses will address the Committee:
Mr. Robert Shea, Acting Administrator Federal Insurance and Mitigation
Administration, and, Mr. Craig Wingo, Director of Division of
Engineering Science and Technology, Federal Emergency Management
Administration
Dr. W. Gene Corley, P.E., S.E., American Society of Civil Engineers,
Chair of the Building Performance Assessment Team reviewing the WTC
disaster
Professor Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College, New York City
Dr. Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl, Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkeley
Dr. Arden Bemet, Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology
5. Appendices
Appendix A—Letters and Questions to Witnesses
Appendix B—NSF Small Grants for Exploratory Research Awards
Appendix C—Building Design and Collapse Scenarios
Appendix D—Additional Reading
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Learning from 9/11—Understanding the Collapse of the World Trade Center
Chairman BOEHLERT. The Committee
will come to order. Before proceeding, I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Crowley and Mr. Engel be permitted to sit with the Committee. Without
objection, so ordered. I want to welcome everyone to this hearing on a
most important, but difficult, subject—the investigation into the
collapse of the World Trade Center.
It is, indeed, a difficult subject because it
is, at once, emotionally rending and intellectually complex. And it is
also difficult because it forces us to cast a critical eye on the
dedicated work of public servants and public-spirited volunteers who
are taking action amid chaos brought on by an unforeseen and
unprecedented tragedy.
But despite these difficulties and the
discomfort they may engender, we felt we needed to put together this
hearing. First, we believe that we owe it to the victims and their
families to learn everything possible about what happened in those
horrifying first hours of September 11—not just to satisfy their
immediate needs and yearnings, but to ensure that such a catastrophic
building failure and the resulting loss of life never happen again.
I must say that the current investigation—some
would argue that review is the more appropriate word—seems to be
shrouded in excessive secrecy. This has unnecessarily increased the
families' anxiety while actually complicating matters. I hope this
hearing, by airing the facts of the investigation, will dispel
unnecessary concerns while allowing legitimate ones to be pursued more
productively.
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But, perhaps, even more important for the
Committee, we need to have this hearing because the Trade Center
collapse raises questions about Federal responsibilities and Federal
policies—responsibilities and policies that have broader application
than this one terrifying, and we pray, unique incident.
The Federal Government, as a matter of course,
takes on investigations of catastrophic building failures whatever
their cause. That is the only way we, as a Nation, can learn from
building failures and change our building and fire codes to prevent
future ones. Indeed, the engineering of buildings to withstand
earthquake damage has improved markedly as a result of federally
supported efforts.
Yet, in this case, the investigation has faced
numerous obstacles. Federal agencies did not coordinate sufficiently.
Some were slow to react. No organized team was at the site for weeks.
Potentially valuable evidence has been irretrievably lost and
blueprints were unavailable for months. What this experience clearly
points up is that the Federal Government needs to put in place standard
investigative protocols and procedures right now so we don't have to
reinvent the wheel each time we face a building failure. That is one
change in Federal policy that ought to result from the World Trade
Center experience.
Another significant lesson of the Trade Center
collapse is that we need to understand a lot more about the behavior of
skyscrapers and about fire if we are going to prevent future tragedies.
All of our witnesses today will call for an expanded Federal research
effort into the details of what happened at the World Trade Center and
what that means for buildings generally. I wholeheartedly endorse that
call. My colleagues and I will have many questions today about the
nature and scope and financing of that follow-up effort. But I, for
one, think we need to move forward with it.
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We will also do some following up of our own. I
expect that the Committee will have a hearing on the report of the
current Trade Center—will have a hearing on the report of the current
Trade Center report when it is released in April, and we will obviously
continue to oversee the related activities of the agencies in our
jurisdiction and we will pursue any Federal issues that merit further
review.
So all of us here, I believe, understand that
we are undertaking a heavy responsibility today by reviewing the
response to the World Trade Center collapse. September 11 is still a
fresh wound. But this hearing is not so much about the past as it is
about ensuring that we protect lives in the future. We are not here to
point fingers, but to ensure that any problems that occurred in the
wake of the Trade Center collapse do not hamper future investigations.
We are here because the only way to move forward is to try to
understand what happened on a day that was so incomprehensible. With
that, I yield to Mr. Weiner.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boehlert follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT
I want to welcome everyone to this hearing on a
most important, but difficult subject—the investigation into the
collapse of the World Trade Center.
It is indeed a difficult subject because it is,
at once, emotionally rending and intellectually complex. And it's also
difficult because it forces us to cast a critical eye on the dedicated
work of public servants and public-spirited volunteers who were taking
action amid chaos brought on by an unforeseen and unprecedented tragedy.
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But despite these difficulties and the
discomfort they may engender, we felt we needed to put together this
hearing. The Committee decided to move forward for two fundamental
reasons. First, we believe that we owe it to the victims and their
families to learn everything possible about what happened in those
horrifying first hours of September 11th—not just to satisfy their
immediate needs and yearnings, but to ensure that such a catastrophic
building failure, and the resulting loss of life, never happen again.
I must say that the current investigation—some
would argue that ''review'' is the more appropriate word—seems to be
shrouded in excessive secrecy. This has unnecessarily increased the
families' anxiety while actually complicating matters. I hope this
hearing, by airing the facts of the investigation, will dispel
unnecessary concerns while allowing legitimate ones to be pursued more
productively.
But perhaps even more important for the
Committee, we need to have this hearing because the Trade Center
collapse raises questions about federal responsibilities and federal
policies—responsibilities and policies that have broader application
than this one terrifying—and, we pray, unique—incident.
The Federal Government, as a matter of course,
takes on investigations of catastrophic building failures, whatever
their cause. That's the only way we, as a nation, can learn from
building failures and change our building and fire codes to prevent
future ones. Indeed, the engineering of buildings to withstand
earthquake damage has improved markedly as a result of federally
supported efforts.
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Yet
in this case, the investigation has faced numerous obstacles. Federal
agencies did not coordinate sufficiently, some were slow to react; no
organized team was at the site for weeks; potentially valuable evidence
has been lost irretrievably, and blueprints were unavailable for
months. What this experience clearly points up is that the Federal
Government needs to put in place standard investigative protocols and
procedures right now, so we don't have to ''reinvent the wheel'' each
time we face a building failure. That's one change in federal policy
that ought to result from the World Trade Center experience.
Another significant lesson of the Trade Center
collapse is that we need to understand a lot more about the behavior of
skyscrapers and about fire, if we are going to prevent future
tragedies. All of our witnesses today will call for an expanded federal
research effort into the details of what happened at the World Trade
Center and what that means for buildings generally. I wholeheartedly
endorse that call. My colleagues and I will have many questions today
about the nature, scope and financing of that follow-up effort, but I,
for one, think we need to move forward with it.
We'll also do some of our own following up. I
expect that the Committee will have a hearing on the report of the
current Trade Center report when it is released in April, and we'll
obviously continue to oversee the related activities of the agencies in
our jurisdiction, and we'll pursue any federal issues that merit
further review.
So, all of us here, I believe, understand that
we are undertaking a heavy responsibility today by reviewing the
response to the World Trade Center collapse. September 11th is still a
fresh wound. But this hearing is not so much about the past, as it is
about ensuring that we protect lives in the future. We are not here to
point fingers, but to ensure that any problems that occurred in the
wake of the Trade Center collapse do not hamper future investigations.
We are here because the only way to move forward is to try to
understand what happened on a day that was so incomprehensible.
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Mr. WEINER.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, first, let me begin by expressing my
thanks to you. While some of our committees have been slow to take up
the challenge of the post-September 11 analysis and legislative action,
you have been a true leader in getting the Science Committee involved.
On November 12, I, and my constituents, had the
misfortune—and hundreds of families were ravaged by the crash of Flight
586. Within literally moments of that plane crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board was on the ground sequestering evidence,
interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing information, if necessary. And
since then, they have offered periodic reports.
One month and a day earlier, when the World
Trade Center collapsed, nothing could have been further from the truth.
According to reports that we have heard since, there has been no
comprehensive investigation. One expert in fire engineering concluded
that there was virtually a nonexistent investigation. We haven't
examined any aspects of the collapse that might have impacted rescue
worker procedures even in this last month.
Second, reports have emerged that crucial
evidence has been mishandled. Over 80 percent of the steel from the
World Trade Center site has already been sold for recycling, much of
it, if not all of it, before investigators and scientists could analyze
the information.
Third, we have allowed this investigation to
become woefully bogged down and in fighting and lack of cooperation
among agencies. Researchers from FEMA did not get timely access to the
designs of the building. News accounts have said there has been
friction between engineers in FEMA because of concerns about where the
information would wind up.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 1 Of 2
Even the National Science Foundation, which has
awarded grants to several scientists to study the collapse, but didn't
coordinate these efforts with FEMA or the American Society of Civil
Engineers.
And, finally, we have seen painfully that the
financial commitment to this investigation simply is not there. It is
not uncommon to spend tens of millions of dollars investigating why a
plane crashed. But we have yet to spend even a million dollars on this
investigation, and the Bush Administration has refused to commit to
release the full funding necessary.
But what difference does it make, some might
ask? Who could have foreseen such a catastrophic event? Well, the same
could be said, frankly, any time a plane crashes. Yet every time we
learn about why one plane crashed, we save future people from being
victims as well. We could learn what firefighters should know before
they go into buildings. We should learn what families, like Vincent and
Domencia Ragusa, who are from my district, who lost their son, a
firefighter who went into that building unaware, as I am sure many of
us, as we were, that those buildings were about to go down.
We can learn about future design of buildings.
And, perhaps, as importantly, we might be able to revisit buildings
that are currently standing and learn ways to make their occupants and
firefighters safer. That is why I am going to be introducing
legislation to give the National Institutes of Standards and Technology
similar line authorities that the National Transportation Safety Board
has. Whether it is a plane crash or a building collapse, we must get to
the truth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Weiner. Mr. Hall.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I will be
brief because there are others who ought to speak, but I certainly join
you and others here in our appreciation of those that are here. And Mr.
Shea who is here representing Joe Allbaugh, who, I think, does a
wonderful job for this country and a wonderful job for the President.
And there is much——
Chairman BOEHLERT. As does Mr. Shea, a very long and distinguished career.
Mr. HALL. Yes. And there is much
more to be done. I think it is more important for Anthony Weiner to be
the spokesman here, and for Steve Israel, because they are sensible,
sincere, caring. And, Sherry, you are the head of this Committee. You
are going to see that New York gets that that—not as much as they are
entitled to, but everything that we can do within our reach. And Mr.
Grucci is doing a good job for his state.
I am just honored to be associated with these
men and with the words Mr. Weiner has just spoken. It is a horrible
time. It is a terrible time. We are battling an enemy with no Navy, no
Marine Corps, no Army, no boundary lines. We don't know where they are.
And I think it is a sorry, sad war, and it is a war nobody is going to
come out the winner. We just have to hang together though. And, as a
Democrat, I urge everybody to support the President. He is the
Commander in Chief. We are at war. We are a Nation at war and we ought
to be closer together than we are today.
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I
don't agree with everything anybody does, says, or thinks. I have my
own mind. The day they struck those two buildings up there, I became a
New Yorker. I am a New Yorker, and I appreciate every one of you and,
God bless all of you. I want to yield whatever time I have left to
Steve Israel, who has some words that need to be said. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL
I want to join Chairman Boehlert in welcoming everyone to this afternoon's hearing.
Today's hearing will focus on the aftermath of
the cowardly attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which
will rank as one of the great tragedies in American history. As with
any tragedy we try to find some shred of consolation by looking to
lessons that can help protect us against possible future tragedies. We
need to carefully examine our emergency preparedness, evacuation
procedures, and emergency response as well as the structural integrity
of tall buildings as we sift through the events of September 11 in our
search for meaning.
Today we will focus on the procedures and
efforts to collect data at the World Trade Center site. I want to learn
how we about the problems encountered by the structural assessment team
and what changes need to be made to our procedures. I understand that
we need to improve the coordination between all the Federal, state, and
local agencies that were on-site. Important information was lost during
the first month and we need to ensure this doesn't happen again. I also
believe that NIST needs to play a more active role in the follow-up
assessment and research that is required. NIST should serve as a
pro-active liaison to the building code community to ensure that
findings of the structural analysis in this case are reflected in our
building codes.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 1 Of 2
I would like to thank the members of the FEMA
Building Performance Assessment Team assembled by the American Society
of Civil Engineers. These distinguished professionals have volunteered
their time to work on this team. Volunteers from the Structural
Engineers Association of New York have also assisted them. This isn't
the first time a group of professionals have volunteered their time and
expertise to serve on a FEMA assessment team. However, this is one of
the few opportunities we have had to publicly thank them for their
services. The FEMA team's report isn't due until April and their work
is ongoing. It may be that the Committee has questions the witnesses
don't feel ready to answer—I hope that we will keep at this issue so
that we get answers as they become available. It is particularly
important that we do follow-up work on any recommendations that the
FEMA team offers. I hope this Committee will hold subsequent hearings
to review the implementation plans for the research and analysis phase.
I would like to offer my condolences to the
families of the victims of this tragedy, some of whom are at this
hearing. You have suffered a terrible loss. This Committee will
continue to follow the issue of disaster response and building safety
to ensure that the lessons learned form the World Trade Center Disaster
will be implemented to improve building safety codes, emergency
response and evacuation procedures.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Israel for three minutes and 20 seconds.
Mr. ISRAEL. I thank the Chairman
and I thank Ranking Member Hall for the time. And let me join with all
of my colleagues in extending condolences to all of the families who
suffered devastating losses, who have assembled with us today.
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I represent in my district over 100 families
who lost someone in the rubble of the World Trade Center. In the days
after September 11, they wanted to know why our national intelligence
and why our airport security wasn't strong enough to withstand an
attack. And now, they are asking whether our steel was strong enough to
withstand an attack, whether our building codes, our fire codes, our
safety codes were strong enough to withstand the attack.
They want to know what we have learned from the
collapse of the World Trade Center, what we learned from the collapse
of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. They want to know whether
older buildings, buildings far older than the World Trade Center and
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, have the steel and the safety
codes that are necessary to withstand the same kind of catastrophic
attacks that occurred at the World Trade Center.
Since September 11, we have responded to the
assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in many ways.
Militarily, we have eviscerated al-Qaeda and the Taliban. We have
started to revamp our airport security systems. We have passed a
comprehensive Bioterrorism Act. And, even on Capitol Hill, as we came
to this Committee hearing from voting on the Floor, we saw all sorts of
new steel barricades and shatterproof glass that had been erected to
protect Members of Congress.
But we are still asking our police and our
fire, our rescue and our emergency services personnel around the
country to risk their lives, rushing into buildings without really
knowing what they need to know about the construction, the integrity,
and the technical conditions that exist in those buildings. We need to
know what could be done to make our buildings more structurally sound,
what can be done to control intense fires caused by airplanes or bombs,
what new precautions should be taken to minimize the weakening of
steel, even under the most catastrophic conditions.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 1 Of 2
Mr. Chairman, I went, with many of my
colleagues, to the wreckage of the World Trade Center only days after
the attack with our President. We have an obligation to those who were
lost in that rubble, and we have an obligation to everyone who walks
into a skyscraper around our country to get some answers, and to get
some answers today, and, even more vital, to act on what we learned.
Protecting our buildings is just as important a homeland security and
economic security issue as flying F-16s over Washington and New York.
I want to thank the Chairman for convening this
hearing. I intend to work with the Chairman on a bipartisan basis to
make sure that we are allocating the resources and the dollars
necessary to study what happened on September 11 and to ensure that it
never happens again. And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Israel follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE STEVE ISRAEL
Thank you Ranking Member Hall, and Mr.
Chairman. I represent over 100 families who lost someone in the rubble
of the World Trade Center.
In the days after September 11th, they wanted
to know why our national intelligence and airport security wasn't
strong enough to withstand the attack?
Now, they're asking whether building, fire and
safety codes were strong enough to withstand the attack? They want to
know whether we learned anything from the collapse of the Federal
Building in Oklahoma City? Or, did bureaucracies simply file a report
on some shelf, only to be opened in the scrutiny of September 11th?
They want to know whether the Empire State Building or the Chrysler
Building could have the same conditions that led to the catastrophe at
the World Trade Center?
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Since September 11th, we've responded to the
assault on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in many ways.
Militarily, we've eviscerated al Qaeda and
we're pinpointing them even this week. . .we've replaced the
Taliban theocracy with a secular interim government that will lead
Afghanistan to democracy. . .we've started to revamp our
airport security system. We passed a comprehensive bioterrorism act.
On Capitol Hill, we've erected steel barricades
and shatter proof glass to protect members of
Congress. . .but we're still asking our police, fire, rescue
and emergency workers around the country to risk their lives, running
into buildings without really, knowing what we need to know about the
construction, the integrity, the technical, conditions of those
buildings.
We need to know what can be done to make our
buildings more structurally sound? What can be done to control intense
fires caused by airplanes or bombs? What new precautions should be
taken to minimize the weakening of steel even under the most
catastrophic conditions?
Mr. Chairman, I went to the wreckage of the
World Trade Center with President Bush a few days after the attack. We
have an obligation to those lost in that rubble. . .and to
everyone who enters a skyscraper in this new age of terrorist
warnings. . .to shine some light, to get some answers, and
even more vital, to act on what we have learned. Protecting our
buildings is just as important a homeland and economic security issue
as flying F–16s over New York and Washington.
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That is why I intend to draft a letter with
Representative Weiner asking the Office of Management and Budget to
allocate the $40 million needed to complete a comprehensive study.
I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member Hall
for holding this important hearing, and I look forward to getting
answers to all these issues.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Grucci.
Mr. GRUCCI. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. And let me just start off by saying I associate myself with
the remarks being made here today about the need to find out what went
wrong, how it went wrong, and how to prevent it from going wrong in the
future. You know, the tragedy of September 11 was one that one could
never have predicted and never could have fathomed.
The extent to which our Nation was affected may
never be completely understood, however, we continue to work together
and to try and find the answers we can—and that we can muster. My
Congressional district is located just 40 miles from Ground Zero. My
constituents were some of the first responders, opening up their
emergency rooms and volunteering their rescue services to their
brothers, sisters, cousins, friends, and all that were trapped in the
rubble. Close to 60 of my constituents were lost that fateful day.
American sat with fear and awe, our eyes
captivated by the horrific site of the World Trade Center Towers 1 and
2 crumbling to the city streets. These amazing skyscrapers were brought
down by the powerful blast of jet airplanes carrying close to 10,000
gallons of jet fuel. The force of these blasts were enough to bring
down a hundred stories of steel and concrete.
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As the many brave and caring volunteers
continue to clean up the horror and debris in lower Manhattan, Federal
investigators continue to attempt to piece together as much information
as possible. I am heartened that the Science Committee is taking a
closer look at the engineering and structural investigations
surrounding the collapse of the World Trade Center.
I look forward to the informative testimony
from our expert witnesses to better understand the issues surrounding
this tragedy. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member for
pulling this meeting together. I think today we will hopefully start to
hear some of the answers that will bring closure to some people's minds
as to what happened, but in order—and give us the ability to prevent
these types of things from happening in the future. And I yield back
the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grucci follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR.
The tragedy of September 11th was one that no
one could predict or even fathom. The extent to which our nation was
affected may never be completely understood. However, we continue to
work together and find what answers we can muster.
My Congressional district is located just 40
miles from Ground Zero. My constituents were some of the first
responders, opening up their emergency rooms and volunteering their
rescue services to their brothers, sisters, cousins, friends, and all
that were trapped in the rubble. Close to 60 of my constituents lost
their lives on that fateful September morning.
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America sat with fear and awe, our eyes
captivated by the horrific sight of World Trade Towers 1 and 2
crumbling to the city streets. These amazing skyscrapers were brought
down by the powerful blast of jet airplanes carrying close to 10,000
gallons of jet fuel. Just to put that into perspective, if you
converted the energy in the Oklahoma City bomb into jet fuel, it would
amount to only 51 gallons of jet fuel. The force of these blasts was
enough to being down over 100 stories of steel and concrete.
As the many brave and caring volunteers
continue to clean up the horror and debris in Lower Manhattan, federal
investigators continue to attempt to piece together as much information
as possible.
I am heartened that the Science Committee is
taking a closer look at the engineering and structural investigations
surrounding the collapse of the World Trade Center. I look forward to
the informative testimony from our expert witnesses to better
understand the issues surrounding this tragedy.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very
much, Mr. Grucci. And all members of the Committee will have five days
in which to revise and extend their remarks. As is the practice of the
Committee, we initially reserve five minutes for each side, Republicans
and Democrats, for opening statement. And we ask our colleagues on the
Committee to defer any opening statements so that we can get right to
the witnesses and the task at hand to learn from their testimony, to
probe, and to finally develop something that is responsive and
responsible. And so all members will have five legislative days in
which to revise and extend their remarks.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 1 Of 2
I
would also point out that because of the extensive interest in this
hearing, Room 2325 is an overflow room, and that, too, has a full
house. And further, I would like to acknowledge the presence in the
audience of a special group of people, the Skyscraper Safety Campaign,
which is a project of parents and families of firefighters and World
Trade Center victims. And they are here as very interested observers.
We want you to know that our hearts and our prayers are with you, but
you have every right to expect something more than our good intentions
and our prayers. We are determined to go forward from this hearing to
develop policy that will be responsive to a clearly identified need for
our Nation and its future.
And I ask unanimous consent that everybody be
allowed to introduce their statements to the record at this juncture.
And without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Representative Constance Morella follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CONSTANCE MORELLA
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this
important hearing. The events of September 11th shocked us all and many
are still reeling from the after effects. Much of what was lost can
never be made whole, and we will always have more questions than
answers. However, it is important to do all we can to understand what
happened and to take all reasonable steps to prevent such catastrophes
in the future.
The attack on our nation was truly
unprecedented, as was our response. We owe a great debt of gratitude to
the men and women who risked their lives to respond to the crises, and
their heroics will live in our memories for years to come. However, we
must not forget to thank the many people who have worked tirelessly
since then in the recovery effort and the research into understanding
why the towers collapsed. Their work will have important consequences
on future actions we take to safeguard the country against a repeat of
the disaster. We have a number of these people here today and I want to
go on record to thank them for their service to the nation.
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However, despite their efforts, the
investigation has not gone smoothly. As with everything of this size
and scope, jurisdictional problems have arisen. The unusual nature of
the crises has led to difficulties in accessing important records and
prevented the timely sharing of information. It is our duty to
investigate the causes of these problems and take steps to create the
infrastructure needed to deal with events of this nature.
In addition, it is vital that we plan our
future course of action. Initial reports on the collapse suggest more
questions than answers and additional research is clearly needed.
Fortunately, we have an advanced federal laboratory dedicated to
research in building design and safety. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology is uniquely positioned to conduct extensive
investigations into the structural failures of the World Trade Center
and suggest appropriate new standards and potential retrofits. In
truth, NIST has already played a large and important role in the
current investigation, but there is much more that can be done. I know
Dr. Bement is here to discuss NIST's plans for the future and I urge my
colleagues to listen carefully to his proposals.
We may never understand completely why the
World Trade Center came crashing down on that September morning, but
that should not prevent us from trying. Research into this disaster is
the only way we have any chance of preventing the next one. I thank the
panel for taking the time to come to Washington to share their insights
and I look forward to their testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Representative Nick Smith follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK SMITH
I would like to thank Chairman Boehlert and
Ranking Member Hall for holding this hearing today to examine the
collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and the ensuing
interagency efforts to respond to the disaster. The Federal Government
has considerable experience handling a wide variety of disaster
situations. Over the years, we have learned from earthquakes,
hurricanes, large building fires, and bombings. All have provided
information that has improved our ability to respond to these
situations, and we have a sound framework in place for responding to
national emergencies. There is no doubt that the efforts of agencies
such as FEMA, NSF, and NIST, as well as many organizations outside of
the Federal Government, have helped to greatly reduce losses of life
and property from these national disasters, even well before the events
of September 11th.
For example, the National Science Foundation
has funded numerous projects over the years that have quietly helped to
save lives in disastrous events. NSF-funded engineering research has
brought forth technologies that have improved the ability of buildings
to withstand seismic events and large fires. After the October 2001
anthrax attacks, it was NSF funding of sequencing of the anthrax genome
that has been of great use in the investigation to find the attackers.
At the site of the World Trade Center disaster, NSF-funded robotics
expert Robin Murphy used innovative urban rescue robots to
intelligently explore tight spaces in search of possible survivors. I
think these types of applications that have emerged to help save lives
underscore the importance of federally supported fundamental research
to our economic and national security. I do not think the value of this
basic research can be underestimated.
However, no one could have prepared for, much
less predicted, an emergency situation of the magnitude and complexity
that occurred on September 11th. The death and destruction caused by
the hijacked 767 airliners slamming into the 110-story World Trade
Center buildings was previously inconceivable. Immediately after the
attacks, a number of government agencies and private organizations
appeared on the scene to help in rescue, recovery, and sorting through
the chaos. Among them were the FBI, New York Police and Fire
Departments, FEMA, NIST, NSF, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), and the Structural Engineers Association of New York (SEAoNY).
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 1 Of 2
Recognizing that the World Trade Center cleanup
was an unprecedented, multi-faceted effort carried out under the most
difficult of circumstances, I believe that the agencies and
organizations involved performed very admirably. There are, however,
many questions remaining regarding why the towers collapsed and how the
ensuing investigation to determine why they collapsed could have been
improved. For instance, why was important information such as building
design plans was by and large unavailable, and why was research access
to steel beams and other debris for the investigation delayed?
Answering these questions may allow us to develop a clearer, enhanced
protocol for responding to these situations, improve building and fire
codes, and build safer buildings in general. All of these adjustments
will move us closer to the ultimate goal: minimizing the loss of life
and property during the occurrence of future natural disasters and
terrorist attacks.
I hope that today's hearing will help to shed
light on these unanswered questions. I would like to thank the
witnesses for appearing before us today to discuss this issue, and I am
looking forward to a productive discussion as we begin to move on in
the aftermath of September 11th.
[The prepared statement of Representative J. Randy Forbes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY FORBES
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
Hall, for holding this important hearing today. Next Monday will mark
the six-month anniversary of the tragic attacks on the World Trade
Center Towers and the Pentagon. Since that time, we have come together
as a nation and as a Congress.
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The impact of 9/11 has required all of us in
Congress to re-evaluate not only how we view the world, but how we
ensure the safety of our citizens as well. I can think of no greater
obligation of the Federal Government than to protect its citizens.
Since 9/11, Congress has responded by passing legislation to protect
our borders, increase our ability to defend and respond to attacks of
bio-terrorism, and strengthen our airport security and airline
industry. Clearly we are a safer nation than we were six months ago.
With that said, one area Congress has yet to examine closely is how the
Federal Government investigates and responds to large-scale disasters.
What can engineers, builders, and designers learn from the collapse of
the World Trade Center Towers that can be used to save lives through
improved building construction?
I am concerned that no clear protocol was in
place for building investigators who were attempting to understand how
the two buildings collapsed. While I understand that Ground Zero is
first and foremost a crime scene and rescue area, we must also allow
investigators the ability to fully examine evidence that will give us a
greater understanding of why the buildings collapsed. I was
disappointed to learn that investigators were unable to examine
recovered pieces of steel from the Twin Towers before they were
recycled. I am also troubled that investigators had difficulty in
obtaining blueprints, design drawings, and maintenance records because
of liability concerns from the buildings' owners. These records are
invaluable in fully understanding how the buildings collapsed.
I hope today's hearing will help us strike a
balance between investigating a crime scene and conducting an
engineering investigation. While we will never live in a world that
will be completely immune from despotic acts of terrorists, we should
remain eternally vigil in our efforts to ensure that safety of all
Americans. Again, I thank the Chairman for holding this important
hearing today and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
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[The prepared statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO
Good afternoon. The events of September 11th
have had a profound effect on America in many ways. In addition to
reevaluating our safety and security, we have been left with many
procedural and scientific questions. I want to thank the witnesses for
appearing before our committee to discuss the data collection
procedures in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks and the
follow-up research needed to better understand the structural causes of
the building collapse, building evacuation procedures, and possible
changes to building codes.
Immediately following the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) assembled a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT)
comprised of 23-members. They were charged with determining the
structural causes of the World Trade Center collapse, including the
collection of steel beams and other structural components. Because of
the unprecedented nature of the World Trade Center attacks, nothing had
prepared our investigators for a disaster of this magnitude and
complexity, involving many buildings and a massive debris pile in a
small, confined area. The investigation was also hampered by the one
month delay in collecting data from the actual site because of the
search and rescue efforts and criminal investigation activities.
However, once the BPAT gained access and arrived on-site, the process
worked according to procedure resulting in an orderly recovery effort.
The FEMA BPAT encountered numerous obstacles during its investigation,
including an inability to examine the steel, either removed from the
site during the early search and rescue work or shipped to recycling
plants, and the denial of access to building design, construction, and
maintenance documents. I am particularly interested to know what needs
to be changed or improved to allow teams, like BPAT, to do their job.
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In addition, as you are all well aware,
coordination among federal agencies is critical for gauging our
preparedness and responding to national disasters. The National Science
Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) also took part in the collection of the World Trade Center site
data. NSF gave grants to eight research projects to begin studies of
the World Trade Center site to study the social science aspects of the
human response, testing new technologies to assess infrastructure
damage, and collecting structural engineering data. Although NSF did
not coordinate its research with the BPAT, I am interested to know if
research done by NSF can be used in the BPAT assessment and if it will
factor into the BPAT recommendations. Also, FEMA has initiated
discussions with NIST for NIST to take the lead on the follow-on
activities recommended by the BPAT. NIST has developed a 4-year
follow-on comprehensive research plan and an estimated cost in order to
take the lead on research once the FEMA's BPAT issues its report. I
want to know the role FEMA's team played in developing this research
plan with NIST.
I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Representative John B. Larson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JOHN B. LARSON
I want to thank the Chairman for convening this
important hearing. Before I ask my questions I want to recognize the
presence today of the organizers of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, an
effort of Sally Regenhard, whose firefighter son, was killed at the
World Trade Center, and which represents over 3,000 members and is
endorsed by the major 911 Victim Family groups. In particular I want to
welcome Ms. Monica Gabrielle from my home state of Connecticut, who
lost her husband, Richard, as a result of the collapse of 2 World Trade
Center. My condolences to you and the other members of the Skyscraper
Safety Campaign who are here to ensure that we know all we need to know
about the structural collapse, the subsequent investigation, and to
make sure that any recommendations are followed through and implemented
so that we can avoid preventable deaths. I commend and welcome your and
your group's efforts.
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In the aftermath of the terrible collapse and
the subsequent investigations that followed, several factors have
become clear:
1. There was no clear authority or effective protocol for how the
building performance investigators should conduct and coordinate their
investigation with the concurrent search and rescue efforts, as well as
any criminal investigation;
2. There was difficulty obtaining documents essential to the
investigation, including blueprints, design drawings, and maintenance
records;
3. There is uncertainty as a result of the confidential nature of
the Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) study; and
4. There is uncertainty as to the strategy for completing the investigation and applying the lessons learned.
Obviously, if we are to prepare adequately to
meet the tremendous challenges posed by the potential that another
tragedy of this magnitude takes place the issues outlined above need to
be cleared up. Yet it is troubling to me that we are not close to
meeting that goal. So far the ''facts on the ground'' from what I can
gather based on information in the public record are:
The American Society of Civil Engineers team, whose report is due
in April, admits they may have lost data due to the decision to recycle
the structural steel.
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It isn't known whether the National Science Foundation studies
can be incorporated into the ASCE recommendations because there was no
coordination between them.
ASCE admits that its investigation is not comprehensive, but that
their report will include recommendations on what to do about the
issues not addressed in their report.
The Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) will recommend
that a federal agency needs the authority to have on-site personnel to
direct data collection efforts.
BPAT had no legal authority to require the plans be given to
them. The BPAT will recommend that subpoena authority be given to some
federal agency to allow access to all information/data required for a
BPAT investigation (neither FEMA nor NIST wants it, however).
Although NIST has the most expertise of any federal agency in
building and fire safety, it has no formal role to play in the
follow-on disaster analysis. After a BPAT team releases it preliminary
report, there is no formal mechanism to ensure its recommendations are
actually implemented.
There is no comprehensive central repository for all information that is gleaned from an investigation of this kind.
If this is all true, then it is clear that as a starting point, Congress needs to accomplish two things:
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(1) we
need to find a way to fund NIST's proposal for a 2-year follow-on
comprehensive research plan, which would address building design,
structural analysis of the building collapse, emergency response
procedures, evacuation procedures and proposed changes to building
standards based on research findings; and
(2) we also need to establish mechanisms for following-through on
implementation of any recommendations, guidelines or standards that are
established as a result of these investigations.
We here in Congress need to make sure we assert
our role in making sure this process moves forward and those mechanisms
are in place. I am aware of the fact that not all of the answers we
need will be available at this hearing and that not all the steps that
should be taken to reduce the likelihood that something like this can
happen again in the future will be identified at this hearing. This
should only be the start to what I believe should be a public and open
process which will lead to significant changes in how we provide for
the safety of citizens of this country.
[The prepared statement of Representative Bob Etheridge follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BOB ETHERIDGE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for
holding this important hearing on an event that effects every American
and our nation. I would like to offer my condolences to the families of
this tragedy.
This is a very difficult subject. The tragedy
that the United States experienced on September 11, 2001 was
unparalleled with any prior accident or disaster. The collapse of the
World Trade Center towers was the largest structural building disaster
in human history. A disaster of such epic proportions demands a full
comprehensive, detailed investigation.
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I am struck by the rapidity in which the World
Trade Center towers collapsed. Aside from withstanding enormous wind
loads, the World Trade Center towers were also constructed to withstand
settlement loads. Because the towers were built on six acres of
landfill, the foundation of each tower had to extend more than 70 feet
below ground level to rest on solid bedrock. Although the towers were
in fact designed to withstand being struck by an airplane, they were
unable to survive the effects of a direct hit by the two hijacked
commercial jetliners and the fires that resulted weakened the
infrastructure of the building, collapsing the upper floors and
creating too much load for the lower floors to bear. In trying to
comprehend how this actual happened, I am compelled to ask if there is
any reason to have concern on how other tall buildings are constructed
in this Country and the safety of the people occupying them.
While I applaud the FEMA Building Performance
Assessment Team and other federal agencies for the service they
provided, the investigation clearly shows that a comprehensive plan was
not in place for disaster investigations. There is a need to have a
comprehensive plan in place to handle large-scale investigations.
Chairman BOEHLERT. We will proceed right to our panel of very distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Robert Shea, Acting Administrator, Federal
Insurance and Mitigation Administration; and, Mr. Craig Wingo, Director
of Division of Engineering Science and Technology, from the Federal
Emergency Management Administration. Dr. W. Gene Corley, American
Society of Civil Engineers, Chair of the Building Performance
Assessment Team, which we will constantly refer to as BPAT, reviewing
the WTC disaster. Professor Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire
Science at John Jay College, New York City. Dr. Astaneh, Professor,
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of
California. And Dr. Arden Bement, Director of National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
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As the Committee clearly can appreciate, we
have a panel of very distinguished witnesses, and we look forward to
hearing your testimony. We would appreciate, as is customary, that you
try to summarize your statement in five minutes or so. We have all had
the advantage of your full statement, which will be in the record at
this juncture. And I would imagine that my colleagues have joined me in
reading this testimony in preparation for this important hearing. The
Chair is not going to be arbitrary. This is too important to let a
minute or two interfere with making an important point, but we would
appreciate your summarizing your testimony. We have six distinguished
witnesses and we have a number of very interested Members of Congress
who want to have a dialogue with you. And let me thank you for serving
as resources for this Committee. Mr. Shea, you are up first.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT F. SHEA, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, AND, MR. CRAIG WINGO, DIRECTOR
OF DIVISION OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. SHEA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and the members of the Committee. As you indicated, I am the Acting
Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration. I
am here today because Joe Allbaugh asked me to be here to address this
Committee. With me is Craig Wingo, who is my Senior Executive in charge
of my Engineering Sciences and Technology Division. Mr. Wingo is also
the executive that I hold responsible for the Building Performance
Assessment Team activity. I will be making the statement and Mr. Wingo
will not at this point.
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I
respectfully request that my written testimony be entered into the
record and that I be allowed a few minutes to make a few verbal
comments. If that meets with the approval of the Chair and the
Committee, I will proceed.
FEMA operates under the authority of the
Stafford Act to respond to disasters. This is an immensely powerful
mechanism. Am I still missing here? Okay.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Pull the microphone closer, if you will so we——
Mr. SHEA. I will do that.
Chairman BOEHLERT. We have a crowded room and we want to make certain——
Mr. SHEA. Is that better, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman BOEHLERT. That is much better. Thank you.
Mr. SHEA. Okay. This is an
immensely powerful mechanism you respond to disasters. Embedded in the
Act is our charter that provides supplemental support to the efforts
and available resources of state and local government. But clearly
recognizing their primacy.
Further, as FEMA operates under the aegis of
the Federal Response Plan, the way the Federal Government responds to
catastrophic events. Huned from over 30 years of experience, this Plan
allows FEMA to coordinate the relief and recovery efforts of the
combined assets of the entire Federal Government and state and local
governments, but particularly, by relying on existing expertise and
capability.
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In a large part, we are doers, but we conduct
our business by coordinating. For example, under the Plan, one of the
emergency support functions is led by the Corps of Engineers, not by
FEMA. Further, in this effort, emergency support function nine became
the primary example of our level of effort to provide support. It is
called Urban Search and Rescue. Essentially, this is highly trained and
equipped local fire forces from across the country. So relying on
resources and expertise provides for a very effective response system
which is also highly efficient.
In the immediate aftermath of this event,
FEMA's singular focus was a search and rescue recovery of victims and,
frankly, re-establishing the viability of the New York Fire Department.
Last week, I spent some time with Chief Nick
Russo, a 29-year veteran of the Hull, Massachusetts Fire Department.
Chief Russo watched the events that day and understood the impact on
the New York firefighters. So he gathered six other chiefs from his
area and was at Ground Zero within hours. His role was to aid in the
restructuring of the incident command and also perform search and
rescue. Chief Russo told me that his mission matched exactly that of
FEMA.
Further, when it became painfully clear that
the operation had shifted to the recovery of the victims, that became
the single focus of the federal, state, and local efforts. The efforts
to recover victims lasted throughout September and into early October
and it still continues. Nonetheless, on September 12, the day
afterwards, FEMA and the American Society of Civil Engineers began
collaborating on the implementation of a Building Performance
Assessment Team. The National Institute of Standards and Technology was
a partner in this pursuit.
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The role of the BPAT is two-fold—to aid in the
recovery process through a rapid assessment in order to incorporate
mitigation measures into the rebuilding process, but, frankly, limited
in scope, to Stafford Act authorities—that is, to the rebuilding
process of the affected facilities.
Secondly, though, as we go through that
process, to use the products of this effort to influence building
practices through changes to building codes. The BPAT, or Building
Performance Assessment Team, process does not lend itself to complex,
long-term studies and it was never intended to do so.
Because of the limited resources of expertise,
FEMA uses the same philosophy as the Federal Response Plan. We look to
other authorities and expertise in other Federal agencies for those
missions. In this case, the appropriate agency is the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. They should conduct the
long-term, complex studies that must naturally flow from this initial
BPAT effort. In my opinion, appropriate studies of the complex issues
presented in this fire and structural collapse, will take years to
complete.
Let me also say that I have not seen a draft of
the BPAT report. But it is important, in my opinion, as well, to
preserve the scientific and technical integrity of this study. Jumping
to conclusions will ultimately serve no one well in the end.
At this point, it is my understanding that the
conclusions associated with this report have not yet been finalized.
Therefore, while I cannot share insights about the causal factors of
the collapse of the World Trade Center, from either a fire or
structural point of view, I would like to share these observations,
which are based on my experience of 25 years.
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In this country, we build buildings to a
minimum standard. They are probably the best in the world, but they
are, in fact, to a minimum standard. What we learn from this tragedy is
probably beyond the current generation of buildings. But we can
influence the next generation of buildings. So I believe it would be
prudent to carefully pursue our eventual conclusions.
Second, the World Trade Center was a tragedy.
And, frankly, it was an anomaly. No one who viewed it that day,
including myself, believed that those towers would fall. Our collective
thought process for laymen and engineers and firefighters changed that
day forever.
While the results are still being analyzed and
years of study may lie ahead, I can still make the following general
observations associated with these types of buildings. Firefighters in
many communities are involved with a building code enforcement process,
but this is frankly not universally the case. So we need to think more
broadly, as all of us have had to be challenged after the events of
September 11.
Not only should fire and structural engineers
be involved, but we also need firefighters inspecting buildings during
the construction process. And the reason is very straightforward. When
experienced firefighters look at the construction process, they can
tell you what the failure mechanisms will be if they ever have to go
into that building and fight a fire.
Secondly, we need to thoroughly explore and
embrace the idea of redundant fire systems or in-place protection
systems for high-occupancy vehicles.
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Thirdly,
there was a failure of firefighter communication systems during the
event, and it continued well into the search and rescue efforts. It was
literally observed that as the search and rescue efforts were going on,
there were handwritten notes being passed in order to effect
communications.
Clearly, the issues that I have just outlined
need to be addressed in the longer-term research effort. I thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shea follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. SHEA
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss FEMA's
response to the World Trade Center attacks. My name is Robert Shea,
Acting Administrator for the Federal Insurance and Mitigation
Administration, and I am here representing Joe Allbaugh, the Director
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
On September 11, 2001, the United States of
America was suddenly and savagely attacked by terrorists precipitating
the worst disaster in the history of our nation. The tragic loss of
life in the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the
destruction at the Pentagon exposed many vulnerabilities to our
population and infrastructure within our borders which could be
exploited by terrorists and others seeking to harm our country.
Within hours of the terrorist attacks,
President Bush had mobilized the Federal government and declared
disasters, making Federal support and assistance immediately available
to the City and State of New York as well as to the Commonwealth of
Virginia. As you know, FEMA helps the nation prepare for, respond to,
and reduce the impact of, man-made, natural, and technological hazards
including catastrophic events, such as the Alfred P. Murrah Building
bombing, the Northridge Earthquake and preparing for Y2K and the Winter
Olympics. September 11th was a ''wake up'' call for our nation and the
entire world. In the war on terrorism, FEMA has a clear mission: to
make certain that the United States of America becomes ''A Nation
Prepared.''
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FEMA's role as an emergency responder was
tested but we were able to draw upon decades of experience in hundreds
of disasters and the solid relationships that we have forged with
States and local governments and other Federal agencies. That
experience and those relationships were vital during the first days and
weeks following September 11th and enabled FEMA to provide the critical
support requested by the City and State of New York to local emergency
responders and law enforcement officials. This support included the
critical urban search and rescue, debris removal, technical assistance
and other emergency measures. The U.S. Fire Administration, an integral
part of FEMA, has been providing training to firefighters and emergency
responders in initial disaster response and incident command and
control—skills that were fully evident at ground zero.
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, FEMA has the lead
coordination role for Federal disaster response, which is managed
through the Federal Response Plan (FRP), involving the 27 Federal
agencies, local agencies, and other groups. This national plan,
perfected during the last decade, made it possible to effectively
support local law enforcement and supplement the response activities
undertaken by the City and State of New York. As for the World Trade
Center disaster, the City and State of New York drew upon as many
assets as they could, both governmental and private, to rescue and
protect their citizens. FEMA has acted in its traditional support role,
mindful of the extensive capabilities and the sovereignty of the City
and State of New York.
The Federal Response Plan establishes a process
and structure for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery
of supplemental assistance to address the consequences of any major
disaster or emergency declared by the President. Within hours of the
September 11th attacks, the FEMA Emergency Support Team center was up
and running and, implementing the 12 Emergency Support Functions
(ESF's) described in the FRP, already coordinating and organizing the
Urban Search and Rescue teams, and setting up the Disaster Field Office
on-site in New York City.
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The most vital Emergency Support Function in
response to this tragedy was Urban Search and Rescue (US&R).
Because the mortality rate among trapped victims rises dramatically
after 72 hours, search and rescue must be initiated without delay.
US&R rapidly deploys components of the National US&R Response
System to provide specialized lifesaving assistance to State and local
authorities in the event of a major disaster or emergency. US&R
operational activities include locating, extricating, and providing
on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures,
and engineering evaluation of structures for safety and building
integrity.
A key member of the US&R team is the
structural engineer, who must make constant judgments about the
structural stability of debris and damaged buildings as the team
rescues trapped individuals. As the US&R teams searched through the
mountains of twisted steel and concrete, these engineers made safety
judgments related to the creation of access points. With engineering
expertise coming to New York City from across the country and present
within city agencies of New York, the initial response activities were
able to pull from an extraordinary pool of local engineering support.
During the initial response, engineering support included:
1. Ensuring equipment, such as cranes, was safely located on stable bases to support rescue efforts;
2. Quick and continuing evaluation of the safety of surrounding buildings, infrastructure and the site;
3. Monitoring changes at the site through surveying; and
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4. Remote sensing using satellites, and supporting rescue workers
on the site by continually reporting this information at shift
briefings, site inspections and visits, and through sophisticated
Geographical Information Systems producing up-to-date information and
maps.
FEMA's United States Fire Administration also
responded to directly assist the New York City Fire Department to
re-establish its Incident Command structure, had been tragically lost
when the towers collapsed. The forward deployed team assisted in
coordinating daily mission planning and logistics for the first three
weeks until FDNY was ready to fully resume that role. USFA is also
working with the fire department on a training needs analysis to help
restore FDNY to its full capacity as it takes on over 400 new
firefighters. This, in addition to the US&R, demonstrates FEMA's
linkage to the first responders in a catastrophic event.
FEMA's singular goal in the immediate aftermath
of the attack was to support local jurisdictions in the rescue of
trapped firefighters and workers. As soon as practicable, and without
impeding the rescue effort, FEMA began coordinating with State and
local governments and private organizations on the next important
steps: the short-term and long-term recovery.
FEMA has an established role in recovery: to
provide grants to State and local agencies and individuals, as well as
coordinating the efforts from other Federal agencies with State, local
and charitable organizations in order to help communities and
individuals rebui